Time and Eternal Now in the Philosophy of Nishida Kitarō　 by LEONARDI Andrea
〈要約〉
　時間と空間は，近代の思想において次第に実在の最も根本的な形式とみなされるように
なった。自然科学ではすべての物理現象を空間的・幾何学的に説明する傾向が強まってきた
一方，哲学では逆に時間が経験の中心的な次元として強調されるようになった。『無の自覚
的眼底』の諸論文の中で発表された西田幾多郎の時間論は，こうした歴史的な背景において
生まれた。拙論では，西田の処女作から晩年の論文まで登場する「永遠の今」の概念の発展
を辿った上で，それに基づいた後期西田の時間論のさまざまな様態を明らかにしたい。永遠
の今の自己限定の説によって，西田は自分の前期の抽象的な時間観において生じていた様々
な問題を解決できた。この点を踏まえた上で，西田がいかに自然科学や哲学の抽象的な時間
観の起源を説明し，その限定的な妥当性を根拠付けることができたのかを示したい。結びに，
西田の時間論において解決し難いいくつかの問題点を指摘したい。
Introduction
  In his early philosophical works, Nishida Kitarō gave little attention to space and time as basic 
categories of reality, cursorily dealing with them only in the context of other themes, such as the 
problem of the inter- and intrapersonal unity of experience. In later years, however, he delved into 
the idea of space and time as basic dimensions of the process of actualization of experience. Finally, 
in the last phases of his thought, he formulated his own original philosophy of time, as a develop-
ment of the new ideas he had been formulating since the introduction of the concept of locus （場所）. 
Such original philosophy of time must be understood in the historical context of the development of 
the complementary ideas of time and space in modern western thought – of which Nishida was 
keenly aware – with its dichotomy between the naturalistic, space-based idea of time predominant in 
modern science, and the subjectivistic idea of time predominant in philosophy.
  Time and space are two of the most basic features of experience, and their role as primary 
categories for any fundamental understanding of reality has been growing steadily in the modern 
age. In the field of the natural sciences, since Descartes interpreted matter as pure extension, 
whose properties can be described in merely geometrical terms, space has become one of the most 
important concepts. Physicists now regard space and time as the very fabric of the cosmos 1）, and a 
strong tendency has emerged to reduce time to just another dimension of space. Physicists have 
obviously always been acutely aware of the empirical fact of the irreversibility of time – the fact that 
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we experience time as an “arrow” moving in a one-way direction, and physical systems accordingly 
change states in a non-reversible way, expressed in the laws of thermodynamics. However, classical 
physics has made it theoretically possible to treat time mathematically as a coordinate in a spatial 
continuum, formulating its basic laws as time-reversible, and since the advent of relativity theory 
and quantum mechanics, the reductionist tendency has become stronger, to the point that some 
physicists have explicitly proposed to eliminate time from the basic equations of physics 2）.
  In contrast, in the field of theoretical philosophy time has gradually come to occupy the privi-
leged position of most fundamental ontological category. Kant interpreted space and time as forms 
of sensibility upon which the perceptual world is synthetized, and considered time as the form of 
the inner sense （Form der inneren Sinnes）. This implies that, for Kant, time is not only the immedi-
ate condition of inner intuition, but also the a priori formal condition of all appearances (formale 
Bedingung a priori aller Erscheinungen überhaupt), as outer appearances as well are perceived as 
situated in time through the mediation of the inner experience of the knowing subject 3）. The first 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason contains a detailed reconstruction of the genesis of experi-
ence, based on the interpretation of the concepts of understanding as temporal schemata, through 
which our experience of the world is unified 4）. Kant rewrote the whole section in the second edition, 
dropping the genetic reconstruction, and it has been argued that, in his quest to find a foundation 
for geometry-based scientific knowledge, he ultimately privileged space over time 5）. However, there 
is little doubt that, in idealistic or non-objectivistic readings of Kant’s philosophy, his characteriza-
tion of time as the form of inner intuition upon which concrete experience is shaped can easily lead 
to the interpretation of time as a more fundamental form of experience than space.
  In reaction to the strong reductionist attitude of modern science – which, albeit still fledgling, 
was rapidly gaining momentum in the 19 th century – Kierkegaard and Dilthey tried to formulate a 
description of reality as directly experienced by human beings in their concrete existence. Their 
attempts revisited the notion of time mostly on the basis of a theological or historical understanding 
of human experience, rather than from a Kantian standpoint, and both thinkers stressed the fact 
that actually experienced time cannot be interpreted as a mere succession of instants separate from 
each other, but must be understood as a dynamic interplay of future and past within the present 6）. 
Kant’s epistemological approach, Kierkegaard’s theological position, and Dilthey’s historical stand-
point came together in Heidegger’s Being and Time, which constitutes the most radical attempt in 
the history of western thought to reconsider time as the single most fundamental ontological 
category for the understanding of reality. Early Heidegger grounded the happening of experience in 
ursprüngliche Zeitigung, the primordial unfolding of time that makes it possible to be in the world 
and encounter things, trying – albeit, by his own admission, unsuccessfully – 7） to derive space from 
time 8）.
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  It is in this historical context that we must understand the evolution and the final results of 
Nishida’s philosophy of time. In his early ideas of time, sketched in An Inquiry into the Good （『善の
研究』, from now on referred to as IG） and developed in Intuition and Reflection in 
Self-Consciousness （『自覚に於ける直観と反省』, from now on referred to as IRSC） 9）, Nishida 
accepted without much questioning the then-dominant Neo-Kantian philosophy of time. The turning 
point in his conception of time was the original concept of eternal now （永遠の今）, developed in the 
writings collected in The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness （『無の自覚的眼底』, from now on 
referred to as SADN）, which are often recognized as the starting point of the later phase of 
Nishida’s philosophy. In this essay, I will first delineate the development that led to the formulation 
of Nishida’s mature concept of time, then I will analyze some of its meanings and implications. In 
particular, I will analyze the concept of eternal now formulated in SADN, focusing on the intrinsic 
dialectical dynamic of the present that Nishida sees as the origin of time and of different time-based 
interpretations of reality. I will thus make clear how the notion of eternal now allows Nishida not 
only to solve the conceptual problems that had emerged in his earlier position, but also to encom-
pass and mediate the differences between the naturalistic and the subjectivistic views of time, by 
providing an original synthesis of the two positions in a third, wholly original view. In the end, I will 
point at some problems and limitations in the concept of eternal now, hinting at its insufficiency as 
an ultimate explanation of the phenomenon of time.
Nishida’s early ideas of time
  Nishida’s first major work, IG, begins with a description of Nishida’s concept of pure experience 
（純粋経験）, followed by an attempt to build a metaphysics based on that concept. As I mentioned 
above, the concepts of time and space do not play any significant role in either of the two endeavors. 
In the description of pure experience, nevertheless, time makes its debut very early, since for 
Nishida the temporal quality of experience constitutes an essential trait of pure experience. Nishida 
stresses that the focus of pure experience is the present, and argues that, although the present can 
appear as a complex construction interwoven with mnestic elements, such elements from the past 
are always synthetized in one unitary reality in the experience of the present moment. When there 
is no interference by reflective thinking, the synthesis results in the flow of a seamless present, 
which constitutes pure experience in the strictest sense of the term, described in Nishida’s famous 
examples of people performing engrossing activities. Reflective thinking, by producing the opposi-
tion of subject and object, breaks the primal continuity of the flow of time, objectifying and separat-
ing single present contents of consciousness as perceptions, memories, and anticipations.
直下の純料経験であっても，之が過去の経験の構成せられた者であるとか，又後にて之を単
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一なる要素に分析できるとかいふ点より見れば，複雑といってもよからう。併し純粋経験は
いかに複雑であっても，その瞬間に於ては，いつも単純なる一事実である。たとひ過去の意
識の再現であっても，現在の意識中に統一せられ，之が一要素となって，新なる意味を得た
時には已に過去の意識と同じとはいわれぬ。（中略）純粋経験の現在は，現在に就いて考ふ
る時，已に現在にあらずといふやうな思想上の現在ではない。意識上の事実としての現在に
は，いくらかの時間的継続がなければならぬ（中略）即ち意識の焦点がいつでも現在となる
のである。それで，純粋経験の範囲は自ら注意の範囲と一致してくる。しかし余は此の範囲
を必ずしも一注意の下にかぎられぬと思ふ。我々は少し思想も交わず，主客未分の状態に注
意を転じて行くことができるのである。例へば一生懸命に断岸を攀ずる場合の如き，音楽家
が熟練した曲を奏する時の如き，全く知覚の連続 perceptual trainといってもよい。（I, 11） 10）
  Pure experience flows as a continuous stream of present consciousness, and this implies time 
as one of its dimensions. What is, then, the interpretation of the nature of time within the conceptual 
framework that Nishida develops on the foundation of pure experience? Such interpretation should 
be able to account for the fact that reflection is able to tell past, present, and future apart, in spite of 
their all being experienced as present contents of consciousness. Nishida accepts, without further 
investigation, the answer provided by post-Kantian idealistic thought: Time and space are just forms 
according to which the content of experience is synthetized. 「時間空間といふ如き者もかかる内容
に基づいて之を統一する一つの形式に過ぎないのである。」 （I, 27） Experience itself, consequently, 
is not thought to be in time, as the unifying act that synthetizes its content in time and space must in 
itself be prior to time and space. As Nishida famously wrote, the fact that experience knows time 
and space （and the individual humans that we always are） means that experience is beyond time 
and space. 「経験は時間，空間，個人を知るが故に時間，空間，個人以上である。」 （I, 28） Our 
experience appears to be divided into multiple individual acts of consciousness, separated by space 
and time, but the ultimate reality of experience is for early Nishida that of a unitary absolute activity 
that synthesizes all contents of experience in one single act. Nishida calls it “one great intellectual 
intuition” （一大知的直観） 11）, and ascribes it to God as the ultimate foundation of reality that 
transcends both its content and the forms a priori according to which it synthetizes its content. 「神
はかかる意味に於て宇宙の根抵に於ける一大知的直観と見ることができ，又宇宙を包括する純粋
経験の統一者と見ることができる。」 （I, 186） Nishida metaphorically interprets such act, quoting 
Jacob Böhme, as God reflecting on itself by making itself a mirror, and thus creating the world by 
giving birth to the separation of subject （the reflecting God as activity of consciousness）, and object 
（the reflected God as content of consciousness）. （I, 191） As I have argued elsewhere, according to 
this metaphor, time and space can be considered as the basic dimensions of the mirror, which 
determine the structure of the projected world, but not the structure of the projecting conscious-
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ness itself 12）.
  For God as cosmic consciousness everything is present in an “eternal “now” （永久の今）, and 
there is no past or future. This begs the questions: What is the relationship between present as 
eternal now, present as the temporal reality of our concrete experience, and present as a moment in 
time separate from past and future? What is the difference between past and future that character-
izes time as irreversible, in contrast with the symmetry of spatial directions? Nishida states that 
time originates from the eternally present act of consciousness, which he qualifies as simultane-
ously static and dynamic, but his argument does not go much further than the intuitions of the 
western mystics and theologians he quotes in this respect. （I, 184） 13）
  In IRSC, Nishida elaborates on the nature of time and space, answering to some of the 
questions left open in the system of pure experience. The starting point of the analysis is the same 
as in IG: time and space are the transcendental forms of the synthesis of the world of experience. 
「所謂個人とか，事実的原因とかいうことは，時間，空間といふ如き形式によって，我々の経験
界を統一した後に考へ得るものではなかろうか。」 （II, 25） Nishida states, as he had already done 
in IG, that the synthesis is rooted in the primordial act of self-awareness. Following Fichte, he 
regards self-awareness as the act of self-creation by absolute consciousness, and ascribes to it the 
form of the logical self-identity “A is A” （「甲は甲である」） 14）, in which the predicate A （A as appre-
hended by itself） is dialectically opposed to the subject A （A as apprehending itself） as non-A （非
甲 ). （II, 69）The distinction between A and non-A, from a formal point of view, is the distinction 
between mere quantitative units, and the recursive nature of self-awareness – whereby A as subject 
becomes object of a new act of self-reflection – generates a series of discrete units that constitutes 
the series of numbers, which is interpreted, in Kantian terms, as the temporal succession. The 
succession is unified and apprehended as simultaneous （as a geometric line） within the arena of 
the spatial continuum, which is identified as the condition of possibility of the whole process 15）.
  This analysis not only clarifies the transcendental structure of time that was left unexamined in 
the system of pure experience, but it also interprets time and space as deeper realities than simple 
forms of the objectified world. They constitute the transcendental form of the act of consciousness 
itself, the basic relationship – to elaborate again on Böhme’s metaphor – between the God that 
reflects itself and its image reflected in the mirror, rather than just the internal relationships of the 
image reflected in the mirror. However, the relationship between the eternal nature of the absolute 
and the temporality of its manifestation remains problematic. Though Nishida does not explicitly 
state the eternally present nature of the absolute at this stage, nothing suggests that his position 
has changed since IG. Dealing with space, which he now sees as more primordial than time, 
Nishida makes clear the simultaneous existence of the elements of the act of self-reflection that 
originates the temporal series: 「余は空間的直覚の基たる同時存在といふことは，自覚的体系の欠
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くべからざる一面であると思ふ。「甲は甲である」といふ自同律の判断は主語の「甲」と客語の 
「甲」とその位置を交換し得るといふことも，即ち主語の「甲」と客語の「甲」との同時存在を
意味するのである。」 （II, 191） Nishida cautions that such simultaneity is not the same as temporal 
simultaneity, as it simply refers to the symmetrical relationship between A as subject and A as object 
in self-awareness. However, this only begs the question of the nature of the relationship between 
this relational simultaneity and temporal simultaneity – between the reversibility of spatial relation-
ships and the irreversibility of temporal relationships – made more urgent by the fact that the 
Japanese word here translated as “simultaneous” （同時） includes the Chinese character for “time” 
（時）.
  The final chapters of IRSC mark a significant step forward in Nishida’s conception of time and 
its relationship to eternity. Unable to explain the metaphysical contingency of experience within the 
logical framework of his idea of self-awareness, Nishida famously resorted to a notion of absolute 
free will inspired by Christian mysticism. He interpreted the act of self-projection by which God 
creates the world as an act of absolute free will, not bound by any logical or transcendental formal 
structure. The act is not a single event in which the beginning of time is created, so that the world 
then develops deterministically from its initial temporal state to successive temporal states （from 
the instant of creation to to successive instants tn ... t n+m ... t n+m+p …）. As the free activity that 
opens up time, the absolute is an eternal now that transcends time （永久の今）, whose center is 
always the concrete present expressed by the demonstrative “this”: 「此意志の中心が何時でも現在
であって，「此」いといふ語を以て表はされる」 （II, 331） This means that every instant of experi-
ence （every tn） is an expression of God’s freedom, and every single act of will of a finite individual 
is free, as concrete expression of God’s free will 16）. In IG, the fact that God sees the world as 
eternally present seems to imply that time is ultimately an illusion, and the universe as seen by God 
seems to be a block-universe, similar to the universe imagined by cosmological theories of eternal-
ism. God as absolute free will, however, sees the world not as a unitary, ever unchanging block, but 
rather as the result of countless instants of free creation, interrelated but independent of each other. 
Each instant in time is an independent focus of the creating activity of God, and the temporal 
relations that make the future appear to be asymmetrically (irreversibly) determined by the past are 
a secondary feature of reality, as time is, from the standpoint of the absolute that opens it, 
reversible.
一瞬の過去にも還ることができないと考へられたが，意志に於て時間を超越し，却って時間
を創造する絶対的自由の我に返ることができると考へることができる。（中略）「我が意志す
る」といふ時，我は時間的関係を超越するのである，目的論的因果関係に於ての様に意志は
時間的関係を離れた原因である，時間的関係は却って意志によって成立つのである。（II, 
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265 f.）
  Reversibility in this context does not imply determinism, as it tends to do in physical eternalism 
– and in the eternalism of IG, in which determinism is explicitly affirmed, （I, 184 f.） and free will 
explicitly denied. （I, 111 ff.） It rather seems to imply that, from the standpoint of the absolute, the 
network of temporal （and spatial and causal） relations is freely interwoven starting from each 
individual knot, i.e., from every individuated act of will, rather than from one single starting knot or 
all at once from outside the network. The image on the mirror in which God sees itself is not a 
monolith projected in an unmoving instant, but is rather shaped by infinite acts of reflections that 
freely relate to each other as originating in the same absolute will.
The eternal now in Nishida’s later philosophy
  Nishida – a non-theistic thinker with a strong need to provide a comprehensive rational expla-
nation of reality – 17） could not be satisfied with resorting to a mysterious will of God to justify the 
apparent irrationality of concrete experience. Moreover, with regard to the concept of time, the 
questions left open in the metaphysics of pure experience had remained largely unanswered. The 
fact that absolute will freely creates all present moments as mutually related but independent events 
can, to some degree, explain the relationship between eternal now and concrete, transitory present: 
Our perception of the uniqueness of each moment depends on the fact that each moment is an origi-
nal expression of the freedom of absolute will. However, it does not explain why we actually 
perceive concrete present moments not only as individualized, but also as transient in a temporal 
sense. It does not explain why, in other words, we experience the unicity of the present moment as 
its passing away and never coming back. The reversibility of time from the standpoint of the 
absolute, which seems to imply the absolute symmetry and simultaneity of all moments of reality, 
relegates the asymmetry between past and future that we experience as one of the most dramatic, if 
not tragic, features of our lives to the subaltern role of just one among the many secondary relation-
ships that absolute will establishes among the contents of its activity.
  With the introduction of the concept of locus （場所）, Nishida gained a firm foundation on 
which to build the further developments of his thought. By interpreting the ultimate foundation of 
reality as locus of absolute nothingness, he became able to provide some rational explanation to 
those features of reality, such as the contingency of experience and its fragmentation in individual 
selves, that he had previously only been able to justify as the result of a principle beyond rational 
understanding. In the first stages of development of the logic of locus, the notions of time and space 
were not explicitly thematized, and were still relegated to a largely secondary ontological role, as 
mere formal categories for the synthesis of experience 18）. However, Nishida soon focused his atten-
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tion on the nature of time, formulating his original theory of time as fundamental form of reality 19） in 
the essays included in the volume SADN.
  In the framework of the logic of locus, concrete reality is not considered the result of an act of 
self-projection by some absolute lying behind the world of appearance, such as the God of IG or 
IRSC. Concrete experiential reality originates itself in an act of self-aware self-determination, which 
is a self-referential movement whose only elements are the manifested elements of experience itself, 
with no room for any transcendent metaphysical or mystical principle. The essence of the 
movement is the self-contradictory relation （自己矛盾） between subject and object – between noesis 
and noema, interiority and exteriority – which co-determine each other in a dialectical interplay of 
mutual negation qua mutual affirmation. The self-aware self-determination of nothingness is the act 
by which reality simultaneously creates and sees itself, as consciousness relating to itself in the 
form of a content that is apprehended at the same time as external, as the seen must logically and 
phenomenologically differ from the seer, and as internal, as the seen is nothing but the seer itself. 
Not only is such dialectical self-aware actualization not a process taking place in time, as was already 
the case with the self-projection of God in early Nishida’s thought, but its logical structure is also 
not describable in any temporal terms, even if metaphorical. The seer is not something logically and 
ontologically prior to the seen, as some Godhead prior to creation, which in a successive phase 
projects itself within itself. The seer and the seen, the act of consciousness and its content, God and 
the world are the two mutually determining elements in a relationship of absolute logico-ontological 
simultaneity. This is the ontological meaning of nothingness as the “subject” of self-determination: 
There is nothing prior to determination that determines itself in the act of determination, nothing to 
which self-determination can be attributed as predicate of a substratum.
  As in his previous works, Nishida stresses the concrete immediacy of present as the fundamen-
tal dimension of the self-determination of reality. In the context of the logic of locus, however, he 
gives a new ontological meaning to present. As there is nothing behind self-determining factual 
reality, and factual reality is always actualizing itself as self-determining present, the present 
moment （瞬間） is the ultimate substratum of reality, the true hypokeimenon. This new conception of 
present constitutes thus the culmination of Nishida’s effort to ground his description of reality in 
the actuality of concrete experience. Such effort had taken a detour in the metaphysical systems of 
IG and IRSC, in which there was a tendency to hypostatize an absolute subject as the wellspring of 
reality, and it is only within the framework of the logic of locus as self-determination of absolute 
nothingness that Nishida can find a way to reconcile his need to adhere to concrete experience with 
his need to provide a theoretical explanation of reality. However, even in his most “mystical” 
moment – the metaphysics of absolute free will – Nishida had never given up on his drive to put the 
immediacy of present experience at the center of his system. Indeed, the way in which Nishida 
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qualifies the present moment in the essay My Notion of Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness 
（「私の絶対無の自覚的限定といふもの」） is reminiscent of the final chapters of IRSC: in both texts 
the concreteness of the present is expressed by the term “this” （although signified by different 
Chinese characters, 「是」 and 「此」, respectively）. The difference between the two positions is 
explicit in the fact that in his earlier work, Nishida opposes the concrete “this” to a logically prior 
absolute, of which the concrete present is the actualization, whereas in his more mature work, he 
opposes it to a complementary “I”, which he conceives as the noetic side of the self-actualization of 
reality, of which the “this” constitute the dialectically complementary noematic side.
事実が事実自身を限定するといふ意味があり（中略）事実の背後には何物もない，物とは事
実に即して考へられたものである，限定するものなくして自己自身を限定する所に事実とい
ふものがあるのである，事実とは現在が現在自身を限定する真の現在の内容でなげればなら
ない，事実に於ては瞬間がヒポケーメノンとなるのである。之を掴まれた今の立場から云へ
ば，即ちノエマ的に云へば，「是」といふものであり，之を掴む今の立場から云へば，即ち
ノエシス的に云へば，「私」といふものである。「是」といふものの裏にはいつも「私」とい
ふものがなければならない，この花が赤いといふことは私が見るといふことである。（VI, 
142 f.）
  This self-determining, self-conscious present takes center stage at this stage in the develop-
ment of Nishida’s philosophy, and is qualified, once again, as eternal now （永遠の今）. As the 
meaning of “now” has changed, though, so the meaning of “eternal” is not the same as in earlier 
works. Since behind concrete phenomena there is no atemporal absolute seeing the temporal world 
as a simultaneously present totality – be it as the unchanging nunc stans of eternalism, or as the 
dynamic network of acts of free will of the standpoint of God’s absolute free will – the meaning of 
eternal cannot be simultaneity sub specie aeternitatis. The eternity of the now lies in the fact that it 
contains within itself the interplay of past and future, thus transcending mere temporality under-
stood as being a single instant of time only extrinsically related to other instants of time. 「事実が事
実自身を限定するといふことは限定するものなくして自己自身を限定するといふことでなければ
ならぬ，それは過現未を包む現在の内容でなければならぬ，一々瞬間が無限の過去未来を包む瞬
間でなければならぬ。」 （VI, 52）
  The eternal character of the present thus expresses the fact that our actual experience of time 
extends to past and future. Albeit phenomenologically obvious, this temporal feature of experience 
has not been adequately thematized until the XX century. The prima facie interpretation of 
memories and expectations as present representations, reproducing past perceptions or simulating 
future ones, cannot adequately account for the awareness of past and future as such. My present 
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recollection of yesterday’s dinner undoubtedly takes the form of a present image I am experiencing 
right now, and not in the past; however, the mere presence of the image cannot explain its mnestic 
nature. When I am aware now of yesterday’s dinner, I am aware of it as something that happened in 
the past, whereas when I am aware now of tomorrow’s breakfast, I am aware of it as something that 
may happen in the future, in spite of their both being present contents of consciousness. Through 
present recollections or anticipations, we relate to the past as past and to the future as future, and 
our ability to be aware of moments in time that do not exist anymore, or do not yet exist, attests to 
the fact that our consciousness, although always in the present, is not confined to the single instant 
of time in which its material content – in the sense of Husserl’s hyle – happens to exist, but extends 
to the time span of its intentional content.
The eternal now and time
  The coexistence of past and future in the present moment is not only recognized in Nishida’s 
concept of eternal present, but is also dialectically explained. Nishida’s drive to provide explanations 
prompts him to look for the origin of past and future in the dialectical structure of the self-determi-
nation of the present. Self-determination has the dialectical nature of self-negation qua self-affirma-
tion, which Nishida would in later essays define as absolute contradictory self-identity （絶対矛盾的
自己同一）. The self-actualization of reality as self-aware takes the form of the identity qua contradic-
tion of simultaneous moments that constitute each other, actualized as the opposing elements of 
concrete experience. Self-determination thus implies the two co-essential moments of the deter-
miner and the determined, which Nishida had already made explicit in his earlier works as the 
complementarity of subject and object, act of consciousness and content of consciousness, or A and 
non-A – although in his earlier works he was still espousing a processual form of dialectic （過程的
弁証法）, in which the determiner tended to be seen as prior, more fundamental than the 
determined.
  As the determined, noematic element, the self-aware self-determination of nothingness is the 
world we experience as given, the object of apprehension whose reality cannot be changed insofar 
as it has already been determined. In this respect, our relationship as subjects of experience to the 
noematic element of self-awareness has the character that Heidegger describes as facticity 
（Faktizität） and throweness （Geworfenheit）: We cannot change the situation in which we already 
are, insofar as we cannot not be where we are and what we are right now. However, as the determin-
ing, noetic element, the self-aware self-determination of nothingness is the very activity that shapes 
the world and acts upon it, constantly changing it insofar as the determined nature of the object can 
never exhaust the determining nature of the subject. From the point of view of Nishida’s dialectical 
logic, the projected self, as the world, cannot be given all at once, like the block-universe of eternal-
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ism, because such projected object would not only dialectically negate the projecting self, but rather 
completely eliminate it from the equation of reality, by denying its active nature: A as subject would 
disappear from the identity “A is A”, as it would be completely transformed into A as predicate, 
leaving only a single, lifeless, non-contradictory A. In other words, the symmetric nature of the 
relationship of absolute contradictory self-identity implies that, as the determined is produced by 
the determiner, so the determiner is produced by the determined, in a dialectical relationship that 
Nishida would later express as dialectic between the individual and the environment. In this 
respect, our relationship to the noematic element has the character that Heidegger qualifies as 
project （Entwurf）: Although we cannot not be where and what we are right now, we can act upon 
our situation in order to change it, inasmuch it is not yet completely determined 20）. The self-aware 
self-determination of reality thus unfolds dialectically as past, in the form of the noematic moment of 
reality, and as future, in the form of its noetic moment, opening up the temporalization of time 21）.
  Nishida’s explanation of the nature of time makes it possible to give an answer to the problems 
left open in his previous attempts. The difference between noesis and noema, created and creating 
– their asymmetry with regard to their dialectical function, which does not imply a hierarchical 
asymmetry in their logico-ontological relationship – accounts for the difference between past and 
future, and hence for the irreversibility of time, which Nishida now stresses as one of its essential 
features. The relationship of dialectical negation between noesis and noema, moreover, allows 
Nishida to stress the dramatic character of the flow of time as experienced in our daily lives. The 
created is denied by the creating, and this means that the already-determined present moment, 
substituted by a new present moment, vanishes into the past never to be directly experienced 
again 22）. As for the problem of the difference between eternal now and the transitory present 
moment, Nishida’s foregoing of any absolute point of view in his later thought changes the nature of 
the question itself. The problem now collapses into that of the relationship between the eternal now, 
as enfolding （包む） past and future, and the now perceived as a transient instant in time that is 
distinguished from the moments that precede or follow it, and its solution too is contained in the 
dialectical structure of the self-actualization of reality. The present as transient instant in time, the 
nunc fluens, is the present projected as noema, the content of consciousness that we experience as a 
single snapshot of reality. In this respect, the meaning of presence can be understood as somewhat 
similar to Heidegger’s interpretation of presence as Vorhandensein and Zuhandensein: What is 
present is what lies in front of us, either as mere object of apprehension, or as environment to act 
upon. As such, the moment becomes the determined that is negated by the noetic side of reality, 
being obliterated by a newly created instant in time.
  The self-determining present as eternal now, on the other hand, is not one element of time 
diachronically opposed to other elements within the temporal flow of reality. It is the act itself of 
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self-aware self-determination of nothingness, the fundamental act of projection of itself within itself 
that creates reality as flowing in time. 「永遠の今が自己自身の中に映す永遠の今の姿といふことが
できる。永遠の今と考へられるものかゝる意味に於て時を包み時を基礎附けるもの」である。
（VI, 368） It is therefore the dialectical act of temporalization itself in which time is opened up, and it 
possess the paradoxical, self-contradictory character of being present moment that does not belong 
to time, movement that becomes stillness, stillness that becomes movement.
それは過去からの限定に対しても，未来からの限定に対しても非通約的なものでなければな
らぬ，時の限定を越えたものでなければならない。そこにプラトンがパルメニデスに於て，
運動と静止との間に位し，そこから運動が静止に変じ，静止が運動に変ずると考へた，時に
属せざる瞬間の意味がなげればならない。それは時を包む永遠の今の自己限定として，自己
自身を限定することによって時を限定すると考へられるものでなげればならぬ。（VI, 376）
  The eternal now, having the nature of enfolding locus 23）, can be conceived as the arena in 
which time unfolds and moves. 「真に絶対の無と考へられるものは，かゝる時の流を包んだもの
でなければならぬ，時は永遠の今の中に回転するのである。」 （VI, 377） In this respect, although 
Nishida still writes about space as a derived dimension on a par with time 24）, he nevertheless often 
uses the term “spatial” （空間的） in a seemingly more fundamental sense, to denote the character of 
openness of the self-determining present, explicitly qualifying the eternal now as “something 
spatial.” 「時を包み時を内に限定する永遠の今の自己限定（中略）時そのものを限定する空間的
なるもの。」 （VI, 400） 25） Such spatial character is related to the social dimension of the self-determi-
nation of the eternal now: The self-determining present is not a private reality confined to a single 
individual, being rather the mutually determining interaction of countless humans （無数の人）, and 
the interaction between humans – between I and you （私と汝） – has a spatial nature. Inspired by 
Pascal’s metaphoric description of God, Nishida describes it as an infinite circle with no circumfer-
ence, whose center is everywhere; that is to say, an infinite openness that determines itself in count-
less temporally simultaneous, but spatially separated （as constituting different individual humans） 
individual acts of consciousness it enfolds. 「絶対無の自覚的限定といふのは周辺なくして至る所が
中心となる無限大の円と考へることができる。」 （VI, 188） Heidegger’s terminology might help us 
once again in understanding the meaning of Nishida’s concepts, in spite of the many differences 
between the two philosophers’ positions. The self-determination of the eternal now appears to be 
the same fundamental act that Heidegger was trying to describe as the event （Ereignis） that creates 
reality as the mirror-play （Spiegel-Spiel） of elements that are what they are only in relation to each 
other. As enfolding locus – openness that enfolds what it creates, allowing it to be – it has the nature 
of space open for the play of time （Zeit-Spiel-Raum） 26）, the spatial arena described by Heidegger in 
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Contributions to Philosophy as the opening whose movement consists of the temporalization of 
time 27）.
Eternal now and abstract interpretations of time
  Nishida’s eternal now is thus not a nunc stans that constitutes a timeless eternity. The 
well-known statement about the relationship between the transitory now and the permanent now – 
nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aeternitatem, the now that passes produces time, the now 
that remains produces eternity – could be rephrased by Nishida as nunc aeternum facit tempus et 
nunc fluens, the eternal now produces time and the now that passes 28）. As time is generated in the 
dynamic of self-determination of the present, all modes of time should be describable in terms of 
the elements of self-determination. Having explained the concrete modes of past and future as the 
noematic and noetic side of self-determination, Nishida proceeds to explain the abstract modes of 
time – that is to say, the conceptual interpretations of reality based on abstractions from the 
concrete reality of the self-determining present.
  The transient now, as noematic element of reality, disappears into past as it is substituted by a 
new now that, as noetic element, was future before becoming present. However, since the opposi-
tion of past and future is a dialectical relationship of contradictory self-identity – since they are, in a 
fundamental sense, one and the same thing, the dialectically self-determining eternal now – past 
and future coexist in the eternal now. Therefore, by removing the noetic element from concrete, 
experienced reality, it is possible to consider abstractly the totality of the transient nows as simulta-
neous totality of juxtaposed instants in time. By virtue of its changing into future now the present, 
already-determined now, the noetic element is what constitutes the flowing character of time, and 
its subtraction from the image of time produces the abstract image of a timeless （非時間的）, spatial-
ized continuum. Its spatial character derives from the fact that time as diachronic succession is 
projected onto the spatial dimension of simultaneity of the eternal now. This is the origin, in 
Nishida’s view, of the physical eternalism espoused, more or less explicitly, by many modern scien-
tific theories. Noematic eternalism is a legitimate way to see the world and to deal with it mathemat-
ically, insofar as it is based in an abstract, but real aspect of time. However, it is a theoretical mistake 
to elevate an abstract view of time to the status of privileged expression of the fundamental nature of 
concrete time, as is the case with many reductionist forms of physicalism. As abstractly considered 
noema is pure being free of becoming and non-being, abstraction from the noetic element is also 
the origin of ideas of absolute being, including mystical ideas of the world such as the idea of 
fullness of time （Vollendung der Zeit） expressed by Meister Eckhart 29）. 「永遠の一面には時を超越
し時を否定した意味がなければならない。それが所謂「時の充実」と考へられるものであり，そ
こに絶対の有があると考へることができる，絶対無のノエマ的自覚に於て絶対の有が見られるの
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である。」 （VI, 141） Although Nishida does not explicitly refer to his own earlier works, it is clear 
the abstraction from the noetic element is at the origin of the eternalism espoused in IG, where, as 
mentioned above, the world is conceived as the eternal, unchanging object of God’s cosmic intellec-
tual intuition 30）.
  On the opposite end of abstraction, lies the view of time that abstracts from the noematic 
element of reality. When reality is seen as pure noema, the world appears as a block-universe, and 
temporal relations vanish, or are reduced to the deterministic causal relations of the physical word, 
in which the future （noesis） is completely absorbed by the past （noema）, insofar as it is fully deter-
mined by it. On the contrary, when the noematic element is absorbed in the noetic element, the 
world appears as ever changing environment determined by the future: It is the world of conscious-
ness, individual self, freedom and teleology interpreted by the human sciences as sciences of spirit 
（Geisteswissenschaften）. When the absorption of the noema into the noesis is carried to the extreme, 
the individual consciousness rises above itself and becomes God （神となる ; X, 228）, as Nishida 
explicitly states in the later essay Artistic Creation as Historical Formative Activity （「歴史的形成作
用としての芸術的創作」） 31）. This is the origin of notions of reality as grounded in a transcendent 
subject that unilaterally creates and enfolds the world as object, including mystical ideas of Godhead 
as consciousness beyond consciousness, intellection beyond intellection （hypernoesis）. The concept 
of absolute free will in IRSC as well may be said to derive from the abstraction toward the noetic 
pole of subjectivity and freedom, whereas the concept of God abstract from the world in IG may be 
said to derive from a similar abstraction that disregards freedom.
  As is the case with the abstraction toward the noematic pole, the abstraction towards the noetic 
pole is a legitimate way of describing reality only insofar as it does not claim to be complete and 
exclusive. Reality is always constituted by the dialectical interaction of the two identical but contra-
dictory poles, and any worldview that relies only on one of them is inevitably incomplete and unilat-
eral 32）. In the earlier essays of SADN, Nishida still tends to see the noetic, subjective pole of deter-
mination as somewhat more relevant than the noematic, objective pole – in keeping with his 
idealistic tendency to interpret reality as phenomena of consciousness – and, consequently, to see 
future as the dominant temporal mode 33）, in line with the existentialist tradition from Kierkegaard to 
Heidegger. However, he is already aware of the fundamental symmetry between the two dialectical 
elements of awareness and temporality, which he would later on stress with increasing emphasis 34）.
  Between the opposite worldviews of physicalistic objectivism and idealistic subjectivism, lies 
the historical worldview, which Nishida sees as closer to the concrete, social reality of the self-aware 
self-determining present. （VI, 146） Nishida states that the historical worldview is still an abstraction 
on the noetic side of reality, as historical time is determined by the future, having the form of a 
circular movement （円環的運動） in which the future acts back onto the past changing it, as 
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opposed to the linear movement of time determined only by the past of the natural sciences. （VI, 
240 ff.） However, it is less abstract than mere subjectivistic views based solely on the noetic pole, 
being rather the result of the consideration of the noema as enfolded in the noesis, i.e., of the objec-
tive world as acted upon by subjects. In layman terms, the world of history is the world of the inter-
action between humans and their environment, in which the future is the main mode of time, insofar 
as human actions teleologically determine the present, but in which the past as factually given 
environment is nevertheless still seen as influencing the present. The historical world is thus quali-
fied by Nishida as the world of the mutual determination and interaction between subject and 
object, born out of the concrete social world of the eternal now, and opposed to the abstract worlds 
born out of the separation of the two dialectical poles.
永遠の今の自己限定として客観界と考へられるものが，絶対愛のノエマ的限定の内容として
社会的意義を有つと考へられる時，それは永遠なる生命の流と考へられる。そこに歴史の世
界といふ如きものが考へられ，かゝる世界に於ていつも主客相対立し，之に於てあるものは
何処までも主客両面を有って居るのである。広義に於ける行為的一般者に於て主客の対立が
考へられ，之に於てあるものは主観的・客親的に自己自身を限定するのである。併し何処ま
でも結び附かない両極端と考へられる所に，相対立する主客の両界といふ如きものが考へら
れるのである。（VI, 254 f.）
Conclusion
  The notion of eternal now that Nishida developed in SADN is a powerful conceptual tool that 
allows for an elaborate philosophy of time, and provides an answer to the problems raised by his 
previous, less elaborated views of time, while justifying the validity of such problematic views within 
given limits. Nishida is thus able to build an adequate theoretical foundation for our concrete 
experience of time, while at the same time safeguarding the validity of more abstract approaches to 
the phenomenon. Albeit influenced by the developments of the concept of time in western philoso-
phy, Nishida’s achievement is made possible by the internal development of his own philosophical 
views, and it is a testimony to the refinement and depth of his philosophical endeavor.
  An evaluation of Nishida’s theory of time, however, would not be complete without pointing out 
some of its limitations and unsolved problems. I will mention three problems that I believe are 
particularly significant for an evaluation of Nishida’s ideas. First, Nishida’s theory is predicated on 
the postulation of free will. Freedom is one of the key features of the idea of self-determination of 
the eternal now – as causal determinism would reduce the determination of the present to passive 
determination by the past – and as such it is an essential element in the distinction between past 
and future, natural sciences and humanities. In spite of having expunged the idea of free will in IG 
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（I, 111 ff.）, Nishida reintroduced it at the end of IRSC as a sort of deus ex machina, an otherwise 
unjustified solution to the problem of the contingency of concrete experience. Since then, Nishida 
simply assumed freedom as an experiential datum, without arguing about its validity. However, 
although the acceptance of the data of immediate experience is a defensible philosophical position, 
it is not unassailable 35）, and given that the denial of free will is a widely held position in many fields 
of human knowledge, （like, for instance, neurophysiology）, the simple postulation of the validity of 
the direct experience of free will seems to be a rather shaky foundation for a solid philosophical 
system.
  Furthermore, there is one important feature of time that Nishida’s theory seems to be unable 
to explain. Time as a linear flow is not perceived as a single unitary process, in which any event at a 
given instant can be equally related to any event at a successive or previous instant. As physicists 
use the concept of “world lines” – specific sequences of events causally interrelated in a linear 
temporal progression, and as such referred to the same object – in our concrete experience we 
perceive our past as radically different from other people’s past. The train of events that made us 
what we are now （our world-line） is different from the train of events that made other people what 
they are now, as the train of events that made the Earth what it is now is different from the train of 
events that made some extra-solar planet what it is now. Such difference is not accounted for in 
Nishida’s analysis of time. On the contrary, he stresses that the relationship between the I of today 
and the I of yesterday is the same relationship of “I and you” that defines interpersonal relations, 
and possesses the same character of discontinuous continuity （非連続の連続）. 「今日の私は昨日の
私を汝と見ることによって，昨日の私は今日の私を汝と見ることによって，私の個人的自己の自
覚といふものが成立するのである，非連続の連続として我々の個人的自覚といふものが成立する
のである。」 （VI, 413） Accordingly, there seems to be nothing in his theory of time that makes it 
possible to distinguish between individuals in the ordinary sense of the word, as temporal entities 
whose continuity is stronger than the continuity between different humans 36）.
  Finally, the usage of the term “eternal” by Nishida can be questioned. The eternity of the 
self-determining present lies in the fact that it does not belong to time, since it opens and enfolds 
within itself potentially infinite past and future, as attested by their present accessibility to memory 
and anticipation 37）. In this respect, “eternity” only expresses the difference between the temporal 
locality of the projected moment （the fact that it is perceived as one single instant in time, separated 
from other instants） and the temporal non-locality of the self-determining now （the fact that it 
enfolds time, rather than being contained in it）. Indeed, Nishida makes clear that such eternity is 
not the eternity of God conceived by mystical thinkers, which he now sees as a mere abstraction.「永
遠の今 nunc aeternumなど云へば，すぐ神秘的と考へられるかも知らぬが，神秘学者はそれに
よって「永遠なるもの」即ち神を考へた。併し私の永遠の今の限定といふのは唯，現在が現在自
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身を限定することを意味するのである。」 （VI, 138; see 148） However, mystical thinkers may have 
conceived an eternal God by abstracting from the concreteness of the present, but mysticism is first 
and foremost a concrete experience, and only derivatively an abstract viewpoint. Nishida does seem 
to attribute to the self-determination of the present some deeper spiritual, even mystical （VI, 40） 
meaning. God as “true time, absolute time” is not just an abstracted thought, but something we can 
touch in the present moment, a transcendence we can see in the depth of ourselves. 「我々は（中
略）瞬間の尖端に於て真の時に触れると考へることができる，即ち絶対時に接すると考へること
ができる，個人の先端に於て神に接するといふことができる」。（VI, 190）「神は何処までも我々
の底から働くものでなければならない。（中略）我々は我々の底に超越を見るのである。」 （VI, 
425） However, it is difficult to see how the experiential content of such contact with the absolute 
can be conceived in the context of Nishida’s thought. In particular, it is difficult to see how it can be 
conceived the temporal （or atemporal） quality of such a contact with the eternal. Since Nishida 
describes God as the self-determination of nothingness in the eternal present itself 38）, there seems 
to be no place in his system for any transcendence we can touch, and it is hard to see what it could 
experientially mean to touch the self-determination of nothingness. If to touch God and eternity just 
means to be aware of the self-determination of nothingness as coexistence of past and future in the 
present, one may then wonder what is actually eternal in Nishida’s eternal now 39）.
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く何処までも投げられたものと考へられると共に，投企的と考へられるであらう。」（VII, 118） 
For Nishida’s criticism of Heidegger, see V, 349 f.
21） Nishida would later describe such movement as the dialectic of the created （作られたもの） and 
the creating （作るもの）. See, for instance, IX, 159 f.
22） S. Odin’s unsubstantiated remark that the fact that for Nishida the future is already contained in 
the present implies symmetry, reversibility, and determinism appears to be mistaken. Odin, Steve 
Process Metaphysics and Hua-Yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Cumulative Penetration Vs. 
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Interpenetration, Albany, SUNY Press, 1982, p. 80.
23） As Nishida wrote to Mutai Risaku in 1940, the inquiry into the theory of time elucidates the logic 
of locus: 「時間の論理を究明することによって場所の論理が明になって来るとおもひます」 
（XIX, 141）
24） 「私のの所謂今の自己限定かも所謂時間空間が限定せられるのである。」（VI, 168）
25） 「永遠の今の白己限定として，今の限定の底には空間的なるものがあるのである。」（VI, 331）
「現在が自己自身の中に自己自身を流動的に限定すると考へることができる，時を包む時の空
間的限定，時の外延的限定といふ如きものが考へられる。」（VI, 403） See VI, 360 f.; XI, 225:
「時の背後に空間がなければならない」; XI, 45:「時間はその成立の根低に於て空間的でなけれ
ばならない。」; XI, 14 f., et al.
26） As H. Ruin remarks, “for the important German term Spielraum, literaly “playspace,” there is no 
good English translation,” Ruin, Hans “Contributions to Philosophy,” in Dreyfus, Hubert L. and 
Wrathall, Mark A., eds. A Companion to Heidegger Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 368.
27） Heidegger, Martin Beiträge zur Philosophie. Frankfurt a. M., V. Klostermann, 1989, see pp. 380 
ff. Needless to say, there are many differences between the two philosophers’ positions. Leaving 
aside more general differences, it can be remarked that Heidegger does not elaborate on the 
social, interpersonal dimension of the opening event emphasized by Nishida, neither does he 
express his thought in explicit dialectical terms （although I believe that it would not be difficult to 
reformulate the dynamic of his Zeit-Spiel-Raum and the mirror-play of the Fourfold, Geviert, as an 
explicitly dialectical relationship）.
28） The saying is a paraphrases from Boethius’ De trinitate by Thomas Aquinas, in Summa theologiae, 
1a, 10, 2.
29） Nishida quotes Meister Eckhart’s Von der Vollendung der Zeit at the beginning of The 
Self-Determination of the Eternal Now （「遠の今の自覚的限定」）. （VI, 181）
30） It seems plausible that Nishida had originally borrowed the term “eternal now” from Meister 
Eckhart, whom he quotes in the section on religion, albeit in different contexts. （I, 185 f.） In The 
Self-Determination of the Eternal Now Nishida explicitly refers to Eckhart’s notion of eternal now. 
（VI, 182）
31）See VI, 238.
32） These abstract temporal modes are discussed in The Temporal and the Atemporal （「時間的なる
もの及び非時間的なるもの」）; for the abstraction from the noetic element see particularly VI. 
237 ff.
33） 「現在が現在自身を限定するといふところに，時が未来から限定せられるといふ意味が含まれ
て居るのである。」（VI, 243）
34） On Nishida’s evolving position on the primacy of the future, and his stance towards Kierkegaard 
on this topic, see 太田裕信「瞬間と歴史」，『日本の哲学』，第12号，京都，昭和堂，2011/12年 , 
pp. 112 f., 119.
35） In the paper quoted in note 2, physicist C. Rovelli argues that, “The notion of time is extremely 
natural to us, but only in the same manner in which other intuitive ideas are rooted in our 
intuition because they are features of the small garden in which we are accustomed to living （for 
instance: absolute simultaneity, absolute velocity, or the idea of a flat Earth and an absolute up 
and down）. Intuition is not a good guide for understanding natural regimes so distant from our 
daily experience.” （p. 9）
36） Nishida does mention the bond （結合） between past and present experience as an essential 
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feature of the individual self, （VI, 358）, but he does not provide any theoretical justification of 
such bond （see also VI, 399）. The problem of personal identity in Nishida’s philosophy has been 
a topic of interest for western interpreters, but the problem of the difference between separate 
trains of present moments constituting different personalities seems to have gone unnoticed, as 
the difference is generally taken for granted. G. Kopf remarks that “Nishida’s self is a momentary 
awareness event which arises in mutual determination… and mutual correlation… with other 
individual awareness events.” （Kopf, Gereon Beyond Personal Identity: Dogen, Nishida, and a 
Phenomenology of No-Self, Richmond, Curzon Press, 2001, p. 248.） J. Tremblay, as well, deals 
extensively with the problem of the unity and continuity of consciousness in Nishida （Tremblay, 
Jacynthe Auto-éveil et temporalité: Les défis posés par la philosophie de Nishida, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 2007, pp. 49 ff. and 141 ff.）, and underlines the link between self and present. 
However, neither of them explains how a particular sequence of present individual awareness 
events can be connected diachronically as a single human personality, and how the same relation-
ship of discontinuous continuity can account for both intrapersonal and interpersonal dialectical 
unity. S. Odin believes that the difference lies in the fact that, for Nishida, “I and Thou interact 
directly but only through communication using the intersubjective medium of language.” （Odin, 
Steve The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism, Albany, SUNY Press, 1996, p. 89） 
However, Nishida stresses the fact that the direct interaction between the I of today and the I of 
yesterday too is mediated by linguistic expressions （言表）, and is a form of dialogue （話し合う） 
based on a semantic bond （意味的結合）. （VI, 399, 343） Linguistic mediation cannot therefore 
account for the difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships.
37） This position remained unchanged in later years. See XI, 379:「時の瞬間は永遠に消え行くもの
なると共に，永遠に生れるもの，即ち瞬間は永遠である。」
38） See VI, 350 ff., and 238:「神といふのは（中略）我々が之によって之に於て成立する場所とい
ふ如きものでなければならない。」The latter passage shows some ambiguity in the use of the 
term “God,” as it is qualified both as the locus itself, and as noesis enfolding the noematic side of 
reality.
39） I have criticized Nishida’s later position on God and mysticism in Leonardi, Andrea “Mysticism 
and the Notion of God in Nishida’s Philosophy of Religion,” in Philosophy East and West, 64: 2, 
2014.
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